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This paper aims to study the joint effects of the 2004 EU Enlargement and Russia’s entry into 
the WTO, and the effects of an eventual Russia-Enlarged EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The 
paper is organized as follows: in Section I, it starts with the brief description of the model used. The 
effects  of  the  2004  EU  Enlargement  are  estimated  on  Section  II.  In  Section  III,  the  effects  of 
Russia’s  WTO  Accession  are  simulated  up  on  the  benchmark  of  an  Enlarged  EU.  Section  IV 
simulates different Russia-EU FTAs, again upon the benchmark of an Enlarged EU. The work ends 
with a conclusion.  
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Introduction 
This paper aims to briefly study the joint effects of the 2004 EU Enlargement1 and Russia’s 
eventual entry into the WTO (World Trade Organization) and of the effects of an possible Russia-
EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The paper is organized as follows: in Section I, it starts with the 
brief description of the model used. The effects of the 2004 EU Enlargement are estimated on 
Section  II.  In  Section  III,  the  effects  of  Russia’s  WTO  Accession  are  simulated  up  on  the 
benchmark of an Enlarged EU. Section IV simulates different Russia-EU FTAs, again upon the 
benchmark of an Enlarged EU. The work ends with a conclusion.  
1.  The GTAP Model 
The framework used in the estimations of this paper is the GTAP model and Database 5.1 
version. The GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) is a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
multi-region  global  trade  model,  where  inter-regional  linkages  come  mostly  from  bilateral  trade 
flows, while input-output (IO) and Social Accounting (SAM) matrixes represent the different intra-
regional  productive  structure  (see  Hertel  and  Tsigas,  1997,  for  a  comprehensive  description). 
Among its’ most basic assumptions are:It is a static model (the model is solved by the comparison 
of the results for two static simulations, the dynamic adjustment path is effectively not 
estimated); 
·  It has a neo-classical structure (i.e., it assumes perfect competition, constant returns to 
scale and zero profits); 
·  It  represents  total  regional  consumption  by  an  aggregate  agent,  called  ‘Regional 
Household’, whose utility function (Cobb-Douglas) is defined over three consumption 
categories (private consumption, savings and government consumption: see Figure I 
below); 
·  It  uses  the  so-called  ‘Armington’  assumption  for  import  demand  (i.e.,  goods  are 
differentiated by country of origin); 
·  Non-tariff barriers and domestic subsides are not included in the model2; 
·  World savings are collected by a single agent, called a ‘Global Bank’ (see Figure I). 
Different closures possible: one assumes the regional shares of global investment as 
fixed, other assumes that the global bank maximizes the rate of return on investment. 
                                                  
1As from May 1 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia will become full-fledged members of European Union, while Bulgaria and Romania have 2007 as an indicate 
Accession date from the European Commission. 
2Such effects are potentially very important for Russia, given the subsides to domestic oil prices.  
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Figure 1. Relation Flows within the GTAP Model 
The current GTAP database has 66 sectors, which were aggregated to the smaller sector 
composition  described  in  Table  I  below.  This  reduced  aggregation  was  chosen  to  make  the 
estimations directly comparable to the “in-house” CGE model built for the USAID/IRIS project at 
the NES/CEFIR (see Alekseev et al., 2004). 
Table 1. Sectors of the Model 
Sector  1  Electricity and Heating  Sector  9  Light industry 
Sector  2  Oil and oil refinery  Sector  10  Food processing 
Sector  3  Gas and gas by-products  Sector  11  Other manufacturing industries 
Sector  4  Other fuels  Sector  12  Agriculture 
Sector  5  Ferrous metals  Sector  13  Construction 
Sector  6  Non-ferrous metals  Sector  14  Trade and catering 
Sector  7  Chemicals  Sector  15  Communication and transports 
Sector  8  Machinery and equipment  Sector  16  Financial services and insurance 
    Sector  17  Other services 
On the other hand, the complex Input-Output matrixes, tariff and tax data requirements of the 
GTAP  model  implies  that  the  regional  disaggregation  of  the  database  (namely,  “Russia”  is 
represented by a “Former Soviet Union” aggregate in the 5.1 database version, so these terms are 
used  interchangeably  throughout  the  text3,  and  there  is  no  complete  regional  disaggregation 
neither for the EU, nor for the future EU members states in Eastern Europe and the Baltics: see 
                                                  
3This causes less distortion than one might imagine, as the Russia Federation is fully responsible for almost three 
quarters of the total FSU (i.e., Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian 
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Table II below). Some of these shortcomings will be reduced by the upcoming 6.0 version of the 
database. 
Table 2. Regions of the GTAP Model (Version 5.1) 
Region  Name  Region  Name  Region  Name 
1  China  11  United States  21  Rest of the EU 
2  Hong Kong  12  Mexico  22  Hungary 
3  Japan  13  Venezuela  23  Poland 
4  Korea  14  Argentina  24  Former Soviet Union 
5  Taiwan  15  Brazil  25 
Central Eastern 
Europe 
6  Indonesia  16  Finland  26  Turkey 
7  Bangladesh  17  France  27  Middle East 
8  India  18  Germany  28  Morocco 
9  Sri Lanka  19  UK  29  North Africa 
10  Canada  20  Italy  30  ROW 
Trade Flows: An overview 
The EU is the largest trade partner of all the future member states. In 2002, the average (non-
GDP weighted) of exports to the EU was 59% of their total exports (from a high of 75% in Hungary 
to a low of 39% in Malta), while the EU was the source for 54% of their total imports (from a high of 
68% in Slovakia to a low of 32% in Cyprus). Most of the adjustment of the trade flows away from 
the formerly planned economies and towards Western Europe took place rather quickly, and was 
actually mostly complete by the mid-1990s. In share terms, the growth of trade flows had already 
stabilized by the end of the 1990s (see Figures II and III). 
On the other hand, exports from the CIS to the EU actually decreased from the early 1990s to 
the mid-1990s (reaching a low point of 16% of their total exports in 1996), them, similarly to the 
New Member States, recovering until 1999 and stabilizing thereafter (average of 27% in 2002, from 
a high of 61% in Azerbaijan –the country with highest accumulated growth in the last 4 years, 
driven by the increase of energy commodities production and exports- to a low of 4% in the Kyrgyz 
Republic; Russia stood at 35%). The picture concerning imports from the EU is similar, in terms of 
time trends: the average in 2002 was 23%, from a low of 11% in Turkmenistan to a high of 40% in 
Russia  (see  Figures  IV  and  V).  As  one  may  see,  Russia’s  trade  relations  with  the  EU  are 
substantially above the CIS average. 
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Source: DOTS/IFS, calculations by the author. 
As counterpart of those developments, exports from the CIS to Russia increased from the 
early 1990 till 1997, collapsed in 1998, due to the substantial GDP fall and Ruble devaluation 
observed in Russia after the crisis, and not really recovering until 2002 (the average for that year 
was a mere 19% of total exports, from a high of 60% in Belarus to a meager 1% in Turkmenistan).  
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CIS imports from Russia are more substantial and more stable in share terms, due to Russia’s role 
as energy exporter to most of the grouping member countries or/and to their role as transit country 
in the Russian energy trade (and even to Russia’s role as intermediate processer for countries with 
similar  energy  exports):  in  2002,  they  stood  at  26%  on  average  (from  a  high  of  68%  in  loyal 
Belarus to a low of 10% in Georgia).  
Exports from the New Member States to Russia were already rather low, at 7% of the total, in 
the early 1990s (bar the Baltic States, where the average was above 20%), but had fallen to an 
average of 3% in 2002 (even in Baltics they were now below 10%). Their imports from Russia were 
also low – roughly 10% of total imports- but rather stable, from a low of 2% in Slovakia to a high of 
22% in Lithuania (for similar reasons to the CIS trade: the trade on energy commodities). 
2.   EU Enlargement 
All the simulations here were done with the GEMPACK and RunGTAP software (see Harrison 
and Pearson, 1996). As all the simulations presented on this paper will be based on a benchmark 
of  an  Enlarged  EU,  it  is  useful  to  show  the  effects  of  the  Enlargement  before  anything  else. 
Additionally, as the main concern of this analysis is with the EU and its immediate neighbors, I 
show only the results for the EU itself, the new EU Member States, and for the most important 
“New EU Neighbors”, the Former Soviet Union and Turkey.  






















Finland  0.01  -0.0129  0.2333  0.2302  0.0908  0.149  -0.0614 
France  0.0024  0.1096  0.2242  0.3254  0.1509  0.2115  0.0406 
Germany  0.0287  0.2864  0.4567  0.6781  0.7228  0.7595  0.1847 
UK  0.007  0.0531  0.1699  0.2117  0.0537  0.09  0.0054 
Italy  0.0206  0.2545  0.4044  0.5935  0.4885  0.568  0.1096 
Rest Current EU (REU)  0.0173  0.1242  0.1096  0.2015  0.096  0.1556  0.0323 
Hungary  0.7143  0.3668  4.3794  3.6687  8.6251  8.7633  -0.8489 
Poland  1.099  -1.9567  9.153  7.2983  10.7781  10.9259  -2.0024 
Other NMS  
(plus Malta & Cyprus)  0.6435  4.5678  3.6474  6.4463  12.401  12.5881  2.6118 
Former Soviet Union  -0.0146  -0.2875  0.0589  -0.1512  -0.5393  -0.5254  -0.224 
Turkey  -0.005  -0.2069  0.1112  -0.0411  -0.3934  -0.3228  -0.223 
In Table III, we have the percentage change effects on GDP, imports and exports, both in value 
and volume terms, and on Terms of Trade (ToT), As one might see, the estimated effects for the 
current EU are positive but rather small, at the scale of fractions of a percentage point (similar to the  
                                   Studies & Analyses No. 279 – A Wider Europe: Trade Relations Between … 
12 
outcomes observed in earlier studies, like Baldwin, Francois and Portes, 19974), and in some cases 
so  small  as  to  be  effectively  non-differentiable  from  measurement  errors.  This  is,  of  course,  an 
expected result, given the marginal size of the new EU member states (roughly 5% of the “old EU” 
GDP) when compared to the Old Member States (OMS). Changes of comparably small magnitudes 
are also traditional on static type of CGE as the GTAP (see Francois et al., 1996). 
Conversely,  the  GDP  results  on  the  New  Member  States  (NMS)  themselves  is  orders  of 
magnitude larger, increasing, in the case of the aggregate of the smaller NMS, by almost 5% 
(naturally, given that those are small economies experiencing a final “integration shock” with a 
much larger trading partner, the EU, that is already responsible for, on average, almost 60% of 
their total trade flows: see Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2000). The imports and exports experience an 
even  larger  increase,  of  over  10%  in  some  cases.  It  is  also  interesting  to  observe  the  starkly 
diverging GDP effects in volume and value terms for Poland, the largest NMS: this is due, of 
course, to the “price shock” effects of Enlargement5. One has to stress here that those are merely 
the static gains, with final outcomes likely much larger. 
The effects on the new EU “periphery” are also intuitive, if one keeps in mind the differentiated 
production and exports structure of the FSU (centered on primary commodities, specially energy) 
towards the NMS (mostly manufactured products of middle technology) and the already highly 
liberalized current trade relations with Turkey: they are mostly negative, but small, also on the 
order of fractions of a percentage point (these results for “Russia” are starkly similar to the ones in 
Alekseev et al., 2004, ibid, at -0.01%). Also noteworthy are the small positive outcomes in terms of 
exports volume. 
In Table IV below, one can see the effects of Enlargement in terms of output by sector and 
country: losses are highlighted in yellow, with the two highest sector losses in bold, while the two 
highest sector gains are in red. 
Table 4. Changes in Output by Sector/Country 
Sectors  Finland  France  Germany  UK  Italy  REU  Hungary  Poland  CEA  FSU  Turkey 
Electricity, Heat  -0.019  0.0696  0.0181  0.0195  0.1098  0.0697  -0.741  -0.224  -2.752  0.289  0.1397 
Oil  0.0113  -0.088  -0.15  -0.058  -0.14  -0.089  -1.296  -1.041  -2.051  0.0182  0.0632 
Gas  -0.061  -0.076  -0.174  -0.031  -0.108  -0.076  -0.668  -0.228  -1.918  0.0795  0.0799 
Other Fuels  -0.108  -0.061  -0.07  -0.025  -0.13  -0.061  -1.167  0.0578  -2.475  0.0598  0.0837 
Iron, Steel  0.707  -6E-04  -0.055  -0.018  0.1173  0.0125  1.0817  -3.35  -3.36  0.1206  0.089 
Non-Ferrous Metals  0.3993  0.0705  0.1981  -0.04  0.1331  0.0751  -1.937  -0.357  -2  0.0404  0.1088 
Chemicals, Oil 
Refineries  0.4114  0.0631  0.058  0.155  0.0862  0.0567  -2.124  -2.36  -1.377  0.0031  0.0572 
                                                  
4They estimate benefits arising from the eastward expansion of the EU for both the OMS and NMS, with the gains 
for the NMS as a whole being three times larger than the gains in the EU countries (30.1 Billion ECU and 11.2 Billion 
ECU, respectively). Those gains are, of course, even greater for the former group, when estimated in terms of their 
respective GDP shares. 
5Piazolo, 1999 and 1998, also estimates rather disappointing effects on the EU Enlargement for Poland.  
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Machinery  0.162  0.1197  -0.16  -0.023  -0.016  -0.094  12.28  1.5341  -0.368  -0.092  0.0541 
Light Manufacturing  -0.35  -0.16  -0.094  -0.16  0.0628  -0.45  -0.862  2.2224  4.9619  -0.116  -0.5 
Processed Foods  -0.035  0.0626  0.3621  0.122  0.1702  0.24  -4.58  -3.87  -0.497  -0.074  -0.223 
Other Industries  0.1294  -0.108  0.0829  -0.094  0.0465  -0.11  -2.025  1.5555  -0.942  0.374  -0.102 
Agriculture  -0.119  0.0293  0.2356  0.1883  0.106  0.2357  -2.76  -3.281  -0.715  -0.106  -0.021 
Construction  -0.16  -0.13  0.0737  -0.126  -0.063  -0.049  11.927  7.487  8.69  -0.32  -0.235 
Trade  -0.028  -0.013  -0.005  0.0003  -0.008  -0.006  -0.5  0.1517  1.7992  -0.067  -0.069 
Transport, 
Communication  0.0656  -0.017  -0.058  0.0298  -0.025  0.0629  -0.971  0.8562  -4.17  0.2261  0.203 
Finance, Business  0.0409  -0.013  -0.073  0.0044  -0.052  -0.019  -1.27  0.5137  -0.994  0.0492  0.326 
Other Services  -0.021  -0.007  0.0078  -6E-04  -0.005  -0.003  -1.662  -1.227  0.461  -0.028  0.0632 
For  the  OMS,  some  sector  gains  can  be  significant,  specially  in  the  Iron  and  Steel,  Non-
Ferrous Metals and Chemicals sectors, and also on the Processed Foods and Agriculture ones, 
while losses cluster on Machinery, Light Manufacturing and Construction. As one might see, for the 
NMS gains are stronger on the Machinery, Light Industry and Construction Sectors (with, in some 
cases, gains of over 10%), while losses are larger on the Iron and Steel, Processed Foods and 
Agriculture sectors (or, in other terms, the less re-structured sectors of those economies). For the 
new EU “periphery”, the pattern and scale of losses is similar to the one observed in the OMS, 
while the gains are on Electricity and Heat and, surprisingly, some service sectors. 
At Table V below, I show a decomposition of the welfare changes from EU Enlargement: as one 
might see, they are positive for all, but naturally for the FSU and Turkey, and, surprisingly, for Finland 
(this due to substantial ToT losses). The gains for the NMS are mostly driven by ToT gains, bar 
Hungary and Poland, where allocative efficiency is the driver of the gains (one must note that when 
there is an aggregate total welfare loss, the positive components enter with a negative share). 










Finland  -1.20  2.44  -0.24  -9.73 
France  0.18  0.88  -0.05  182.47 
Germany  0.37  0.65  -0.02  1606.25 
UK  0.76  0.10  0.14  118.98 
Italy  0.44  0.65  -0.09  528.80 
REU  0.53  0.44  0.03  649.07 
Hungary  4.94  -3.33  -0.61  59.11 
Poland  7.19  -3.64  -2.55  190.39 
Rest of NMS  
(plus Malta & Cyprus)  0.30  0.63  0.07  3696.30 
Former Soviet Union  0.24  0.86  -0.09  -353.10 
Turkey  0.08  0.85  0.07  -122.12  
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3.   Russia’s WTO Accession 
The Russian Federation applied for membership in the WTO in 1993, over ten years ago. 
Negotiations on the terms of Accession are still ongoing, but below we show estimations of the 
effects  a  “tariff  shock”  from  the  Russian  WTO  entry,  where  the  Russian  agreed  WTO  tariff 
“bindings”  were  taken  from  Alekseev  et  al.,  2004,  ibid,  and  estimated  on  an  “Enlarged  EU” 
benchmark (those tariffs are shown on the Annex). The results are show on Table VI below. 






















Finland  -0.0004  -0.0561  0.0782  0.0425  -0.0062  0.0067  -0.0486 
France  -0.0005  0.0675  0.0854  0.1448  0.1336  0.1441  0.0489 
Germany  0.0052  0.0516  0.1419  0.1859  0.1913  0.1945  0.0409 
UK  0.0008  0.0193  0.0497  0.0663  0.0343  0.0419  0.0091 
Italy  0.0035  0.0639  0.1235  0.1728  0.1565  0.1752  0.0307 
REU  0.0031  0.0153  0.033  0.0492  0.0224  0.0355  0.0032 
Hungary  0.0152  -0.2885  1.4807  1.2056  1.9445  1.9782  -0.3088 
Poland  0.1457  -1.6924  5.047  4.0083  3.6872  3.7356  -1.0871 
Rest of NMS  0.0573  1.064  1.161  1.8722  3.0428  3.0835  0.6706 
FSU  -0.0007  -0.0607  0.022  -0.0255  -0.0666  -0.0959  -0.0182 
Turkey  -0.0013  -0.0697  0.0324  -0.0206  -0.1115  -0.0955  -0.069 
As one might see, the effects are rather marginal for Russia itself6, which reflects the small 
size of its economy (roughly 3% of the Enlarged EU GDP), the concentration of Russian exports 
and  productive  structure  in  mostly  already  liberalized  sectors  (namely,  energy-intensive 
commodities and sub-products are directly responsible for roughly 20% of the Russian GDP and 
half of the trade with the EU) and the limited reductions of the proposed WTO tariff “bindings”. I 
estimate a –0.06% GDP loss (again, starkly similar to Alekseev et al., ibid, 2004, who estimate a –
0.13 loss, and to Sulamaa and Widgren, 2002, and UNECE, 2003; Jesper et al., 2002,estimate 
much larger gains, but only with the addition of somewhat ad hoc long run dynamics to a CGE), 
with negligible effects for the OMS and for Turkey. On the other hand, changes in GDP are actually 
positive for the aggregate of the smaller NMS, with losses in value (but gains in volume) observed 
for Hungary and specially Poland. Both imports and exports increase significantly for all the NMS, 
and ToT will also improve, again bar for Hungary and Poland. All in all, Russian WTO Accession 
                                                  
6One must remember that this “Russia” is actually an FSU aggregate. As an example of what could happen to the rest of 
the FSU if Russia entered the WTO alone, Vinhas de Souza, 2004, using a small CGE, estimates a GDP loss of 1.25% 
to the Republic of Belarus. The welfare loss is much smaller (-0.23%), as ToT gains partially compensate for the reduced 
domestic production (here, one must remember that, due to the Russia-Belarus FTA, Belarus does realizes ToT gains 
through Russia’s WTO Accession).  
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will yield more benefits to most of the NMS than to Russia itself (bar Poland and, to a much lesser 
degree, Hungary). 
Again, on Table VII below I show the effects of Russia’s WTO Accession in terms of output 
changes by sector/country. 
Table 7. Changes in Output by Sector/Country 
Sectors  Finland  France  Germany  UK  Italy  REU  Hungary  Poland  CEA  FSU  Turkey 
Electricity, Heat  0.0054  -0.003  0.0162  0.006  0.0312  0.0211  -0.2255  0.174  -0.89  0.0712  0.0356 
Oil  0.045  -0.04  -0.0267  -0.0129  -0.035  -0.0133  -0.219  0.0712  -0.6491  0.0094  0.0287 
Gas  0.0005  -0.0355  -0.039  -0.0101  -0.0294  -0.0145  -0.1381  0.0352  -0.5957  0.0124  0.0267 
Other Fuels  -0.0167  -0.04  -0.0107  -0.0104  -0.041  -0.0149  -0.1882  0.202  -0.8144  0.0068  0.0243 
Iron, Steel  0.443  -0.0223  0.12  0.0053  0.085  0.0456  0.5681  0.6894  -2.302  0.072  0.0657 
Non-Ferrous Metals  0.173  0.0088  0.129  -0.0063  0.0726  0.0318  -0.308  0.7218  -1.673  0.0181  0.0509 
Chemicals, Oil 
Refineries  0.23  -0.0347  0.0069  0.0443  0.0047  0.0006  -0.3401  0.1063  -0.7732  0.0339  0.0329 
Machinery  0.0122  0.085  -0.0179  0.0023  -0.036  -0.0894  2.893  1.3402  -0.9089  -0.0142  0.071 
Light Manufacturing  -0.125  -0.0071  -0.0262  -0.097  0.0684  -0.218  0.2999  2.878  1.3499  -0.0739  -0.1747 
Processed Foods  -0.117  0.04  -0.042  0.049  -0.0317  0.096  -1.192  -1.907  1.4997  -0.094  -0.104 
Other Industries  0.0107  -0.068  0.0574  -0.0334  0.0551  -0.0178  -0.1777  0.4837  -0.7308  0.078  -0.0214 
Agriculture  -0.0453  0.0053  0.0811  0.14  0.079  0.171  -0.91  -2.178  -0.0595  -0.091  -0.0136 
Construction  -0.073  -0.0069  0.0041  -0.024  -0.012  -0.0184  2.0482  1.7129  1.886  -0.0582  -0.0635 
Trade  -0.0102  -0.0073  -0.0016  0  -0.0042  -0.0045  -0.2048  -0.2247  0.4073  -0.0097  -0.0197 
Transport, 
Communication  0.0456  -0.0356  -0.0044  0.0036  -0.0026  0.034  -0.2253  0.4512  -1.0401  0.061  0.0669 
Finance, Business  0.0304  -0.0124  -0.0147  -0.0041  -0.0174  0.0038  -0.2565  0.2546  -0.292  0.0132  0.096 
Other Services  -0.0128  -0.0035  -0.0004  -0.0014  -0.0041  -0.0018  -0.4973  -0.8341  0.0501  0.0001  0.0185 
As one might see, even at a sector level, gains and losses for Russia are truly marginal. Also, 
sector gains and losses are mainly marginal for most of the OMS and Turkey, bar Finland, which 
has some significant gains in the Iron/Steel and Chemicals sectors, and some losses in the Light 
Manufactures and Processed Foods sectors. For the NMS, on the other hand, significant gains can 
be observed at the Machinery, Light Manufacturing, Construction and Processed Foods sectors, 
while major losses are observed at the Agriculture and Processed Foods (Poland and Hungary) 
and Metal sectors.  










Finland  0.02  1.15  -0.17  -18.4 
France  -0.04  1.10  -0.06  159.9 
Germany  0.32  0.68  0.00  338.8  
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UK  0.21  0.64  0.15  45.95 
Italy  0.32  0.77  -0.09  124.5 
REU  0.61  0.30  0.09  98.99 
Hungary  -0.08  0.89  0.18  -83.2 
Poland  -0.40  0.91  0.50  -440 
Rest of NMS  
(plus Malta & Cyprus)  0.12  0.75  0.13  846.9 
Former Soviet Union  0.18  1.20  -0.37  -23.64 
Turkey  0.07  0.86  0.07  -36.90 
At Table VIII above, I show again a decomposition of the welfare changes from Russia’s WTO 
Accession: as one might see, Russia registers a small welfare loss, as do Turkey and Finland. The 
sizable gains for the NMS are again mostly driven by ToT gains, but Hungary and specially Poland 
do show significant losses. 
4.   A Russia-Enlarged EU FTA 
s part of the “Common European Space” EU project, some sort of free trade agreement (FTA) 
with the Russian Federation is envisaged at some point in the future7. Therefore, in this section I 
estimate the effects of such a potential FTA, assuming first a FTA limited to manufacturing sectors 
but with a complete elimination of tariff barriers in those sectors, up on the benchmark simulation of 
an Enlarged EU. Given the uncertainty concerning the timeframe of any eventual Russian WTO 
Accession, I do no estimate such an FTA upon a benchmark composed of EU Enlargement plus 
Russian WTO Accession, which also enable one to compare the potential specific gains of both 
those strategies. The results are show on Table IX below. 






















Finland  0.034  0.5168  0.2174  0.547  0.8352  0.8484  0.3164 
France  0.0037  0.0688  0.0856  0.1477  0.0405  0.089  0.0136 
Germany  0.0099  0.1789  0.1418  0.2866  0.246  0.293  0.0979 
UK  0.0041  0.063  0.0909  0.1402  0.0638  0.0937  0.0194 
                                                  
7As agreed at the St. Petersburg Summit in June 2003. The legal basis for EU relations with Russia is the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994, which came into force in December 1997, and is valid for an initial period of 
ten years: it was duly renewed in 2004. The PCA established a liberalisation of trade based on MFN treatment for most 
of the bilateral trade in goods (more precisely, most of the EU-Russia trade in goods benefits from the EU’s General 
System of Preferences -GSP). The EU has laid down its basic approach to relations with Russia in a “Common Strategy” 
of 1999, which will remain until June 2004. Technical assistance is also provided to support agreed objectives through 
the TACIS programme (which includes assistance towards WTO Accession). A number of specific trade agreements 
have also been concluded (namely, steel and textiles are the main industry sectors covered by bilateral trade agree-
ments: the steel agreement entered into force in July 2002 and a textiles agreement was concluded in 1998).  
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Italy  0.0062  0.1702  0.1247  0.2545  0.2044  0.2469  0.0872 
REU  0.0077  0.1221  0.0575  0.145  0.0958  0.1418  0.0414 
Hungary  0.0737  0.9658  0.0936  0.6041  0.9129  0.9833  0.4401 
Poland  0.1757  1.5402  -0.0415  0.8962  1.6747  1.7522  0.8602 
REST of NMS  0.0605  0.5811  0.2058  0.5571  0.8046  0.8717  0.2841 
Former Soviet Union  0.2077  -1.069  4.0536  3.4754  6.6184  6.5635  -0.5233 
Turkey  -0.0102  -0.4515  0.0228  -0.3455  -0.5921  -0.5944  -0.366 
As one might see, the outcome now is much more significant for Russia: there is a rather small 
but significant increase in GDP volume (and a much larger fall in GDP value, given the “price 
shock”  from  liberalization  and  the  ToT  losses)  and  truly  substantial  increases  in  exports  and 
imports: this is explained by the comprehensive liberalization in manufactured goods trade with a 
large economy which is already one of the major Russian trading partners, the EU. Naturally, for 
the OMS the effects are still marginal but larger than in the WTO scenario, and are mostly positive. 
Now they are also larger for Turkey, and unambiguously negative. The effects on the NMS are, of 
course, substantially larger than for the OMS, given their productive structure and remaining trade 
ties with Russia, and more unambiguously positive than at the WTO scenario, as Hungary and 
Poland have both GDP volume and value increases, plus ToT gains, but the increases in exports 
and exports are smaller than in the WTO scenario.  
Again,  on  Table  X  below  I  show  the  effects  of  such  a  EU-Russia  FTA  in  terms  of  output 
changes  per  sector/country.  Gains  for  Russia  are  greater  at  the  Iron/Steel  and  Construction 
sectors, while losses are larger on the Machinery and Light Industry ones. For Turkey, losses are 
greater on the Light Manufacturing and Processed Foods, while gains are larger on Iron/Steel and 
Finance. For the OMS, changes are, as one should expect, mostly marginal, bar for Finland, where 
the Non-Ferrous and the Other Industries sectors have significant gains, and Iron/Steel and Light 
Manufacturing  the  larger  losses.  For  the  NMS,  significant  losses  are  observed  in  the  Metals, 
Machinery  and  Light  Manufacturing  sectors,  while  the  larger  gains  are  on  Processed  Foods, 
Construction and Machinery sectors. 
Table 10. Changes in Output by Sector/Country 
Sectors  Finland  France  Germany  UK  Italy  REU  Hungary  Poland  CEA  Russia  Turkey 
Electricity, Heat  -0.246  0.008  -0.03  0.005  0.013  0.009  -0.049  -0.713  0.326  0.067  -0.019 
Oil  -0.132  -0.048  -0.094  -0.04  -0.093  -0.073  -0.264  -0.588  -0.286  0.263  0.147 
Gas  -0.251  -0.037  -0.105  -0.04  -0.073  -0.077  -0.287  0.048  -0.198  0.175  0.163 
Other Fuels  -0.227  -0.05  -0.062  -0.03  -0.087  -0.057  -0.354  -0.562  -0.308  0.279  0.077 
Iron, Steel  -0.51  -0.17  -0.14  -0.12  -0.17  -0.21  -0.891  -2.88  -1.05  1.91  0.37 
Non-Ferrous Metals  1.42  -0.004  -0.048  -0.05  -0.034  -0.036  -1.16  -1.313  -0.065  0.497  -0.109 
Chemicals, Oil 
Refineries  0.203  0.011  -0.11  0.005  -0.068  -0.11  0.182  0.52  -0.077  0.63  -0.147 
Machinery  0.404  0.07  0.012  0.09  -0.064  0.031  0.833  -1.1  0.66  -3.08  0.171  
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Light Manufacturing  -0.72  0.12  0.21  0.11  0.61  0.23  -1.24  0.21  -0.354  -1.63  -1.05 
Processed Foods  0.959  0.051  0.19  0.036  0.03  0.14  1.82  1.35  0.012  -1.159  -0.29 
Other Industries  1.56  -0.02  0.037  -0.019  -0.1  -0.105  -0.505  0.086  0.185  -0.175  -0.025 
Agriculture  -0.313  -0.005  -0.007  -0.01  -0.059  0.067  0.022  0.064  -0.107  -0.234  0.038 
Construction  0.394  -0.07  -0.002  -0.05  -0.024  -0.003  0.84  0.85  0.45  2.25  -0.223 
Trade  0.04  -0.005  0.003  8E-04  -0.002  -0.001  0.048  0.201  0.127  0.15  -0.096 
Transport, 
Communication  -0.259  -0.036  -0.066  -0.024  -0.056  -0.034  -0.287  -0.71  -0.4  0.452  0.294 
Finance, Business  -0.194  -0.013  -0.042  -0.013  -0.037  -0.036  -0.331  -0.376  -0.083  0.134  0.53 
Other Services  0.025  -0.006  0.005  -0.005  -0.001  -0.007  -0.019  0.254  0.089  -0.135  0.086 
Finally, at Table XI below, I show the decomposition of the welfare changes from Russia-EU 
FTA: as one might see, Russia shows substantial welfare gains, driven mainly by increases in 
allocative efficiency. All the other regions show significant gains, bar Turkey, who unambiguously 
loses from a Russia-EU FTA. 
Another simulation, with a comprehensive Russia-EU FTA (i.e., complete elimination of tariff 
barriers in all sectors) was also performed, but as its results were qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to the ones of the partial FTA above (due to the previously indicated productive structure of 
the Russian economy, which is biased towards energy commodities and certain industrial sectors). 
Therefore, I do not show then here, but they are available from the author upon request. 
Table 11. Decomposition of Welfare Changes 
Regions 
Allocative 
Efficiency  Terms of Trade  I-S Effect  Total 
Finland  0.25  0.91  -0.16  158.92 
France  0.61  0.72  -0.33  84.20 
Germany  0.29  0.79  -0.07  713.60 
UK  0.45  0.52  0.03  118.32 
Italy  0.24  0.92  -0.16  289.52 
REU  0.31  0.74  -0.05  494.95 
Hungary  0.20  0.69  0.11  148.52 
Poland  0.33  0.46  0.21  647.52 
Rest of NMS  
(plus Malta & Cyprus)  0.25  0.59  0.16  439.61 
Former Soviet Union  1.86  -1.13  0.27  635.35 
Turkey  0.09  0.76  0.15  -208.84 
Separating a Russia-EU FTA from the Russian WTO Accession is analytically correct, as it 
enables one to compare the outcomes of the two alternatives, but from political point of view, it is 
unlikely that the EU would consider even a limited FTA without WTO Accession. Therefore, the 
same FTA (full and partial) liberalization “shocks” as above were estimated, but now upon the  
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benchmark of an Enlarged EU and a Russia that is already a WTO member: remarkably, the 
results are only marginally different from the ones estimated for FTA-only scenario above (again, I 
do not show the results here, but they are available upon request). This again stresses the point 
that a mere WTO Accession, under the current negotiating terms, will have marginal effects on 
Russia, while a FTA with the EU yields potentially far greater gains for the country. 
5.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  estimations  of  the  combined  potential  effects  of  the  EU  2004  Eastern 
Enlargement, the eventual Russian Accession to the WTO and different types of possible Russia-
EU  FTAs  were  presented.  The  results  show  that  i)  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  2004  EU 
Enlargement will be the New EU Member states, with the other regions showing marginal gains or 
losses, ii) Russian WTO Accession will have fairly marginal effects for Russia and for most other 
regions, but will generate substantial gains for the New EU Member States and iii) even a limited 
Russia-EU  FTA  will  generate  substantial  gains  for  Russia  (far  above  any  gains  from  WTO 
Accession, even when such an FTA is estimated upon a “Russia’s WTO Accession” benchmark8) 
and will also be beneficial for all the EU Members, old and new. Nevertheless, other neighbor 
states left out of such a possible FTA (like, for instance, Turkey) will be unambiguous losers in this 
last scenario. 
Of course, the estimations here presented are incomplete and partial, given the limitations of 
the  dataset  used  and  the  mostly  static  nature  of  the  model,  and  can,  therefore,  be  improved. 
Nevertheless, the outcomes are sensible and similar to the ones obtained in comparable studies. 
Additionally,  one  must  remember  that,  given  the  static  nature  of  the  model,  if  anything,  the 






                                                  
8Rose, 2003, estimated that WTO Accession has non-significant trade-creating effects, possibly due to the “lowest 
common denominator” constraints of the WTO Accession negotiation process. As regional FTAs usually go much deeper 
towards liberalization amongst its members (like, for instance, the EU itself) the pay off is much greater.  
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  Benchmark tariff levels on goods 
EU-15 import tariffs  From Russia  From AC  From CIS  From ROW 
Electricity and heat  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000% 
Oil and gas  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.23537% 
Other fuels  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000% 
Ferrous metallurgy   0.12901%  0.00000%  0.73550%  2.05646% 
Nonferrous metallurgy   1.45847%  0.00027%  0.56707%  1.28104% 
Chemical industry and oil refinery  1.17714%  0.00012%  3.50905%  4.46599% 
Machinery and equipment   0.94857%  0.00002%  0.37784%  1.96658% 
Light industry   7.98757%  0.00005%  8.02539%  9.89362% 
Food-processing industry   2.63870%  2.52149%  5.27055%  6.56990% 
Other industries   0.49104%  0.00007%  0.60847%  1.89720% 
Agriculture and forestry   0.00015%  0.00609%  0.00001%  0.18045% 
Construction  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000% 
Transport and communication  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000% 
Other services  0.12960%  0.00000%  0.22374%  0.71192% 
Finance, banking and insurance  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000%  0.00000% 
NMS Tariffs 
  Benchmark tariff levels on goods 
AC-10 import tariffs  From Russia  From EU  From CIS  From ROW 
Electricity and heat  1.4177%  1.0110%  1.4177%  1.4177% 
Oil and gas  2.0766%  2.0463%  2.0766%  2.0766% 
Other fuels  3.1358%  1.0098%  3.1358%  3.1358% 
Ferrous metallurgy   9.0029%  1.1696%  9.0029%  9.0029% 
Nonferrous metallurgy   7.4467%  1.1897%  7.4467%  7.4467% 
Chemical industry and oil refinery  6.7996%  1.9131%  6.7996%  6.7996% 
Machinery and equipment   4.9169%  1.7405%  4.9169%  4.9169% 
Light industry   11.1020%  2.0803%  11.1020%  11.1020% 
Food-processing industry   17.6880%  11.1048%  17.6880%  17.6880% 
Other industries   6.3838%  1.5137%  6.3838%  6.3838% 
Agriculture and forestry   17.6773%  8.6417%  17.6773%  17.6773% 
Construction  0.0000%  0.0000%  0.0000%  0.0000% 
Transport and communication  0.0000%  0.0000%  0.0000%  0.0000% 
Other services  7.7563%  3.9258%  7.7563%  7.7563% 
Finance, banking and insurance  14.8008%  14.8008%  14.8008%  14.8008%  
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Russian Tariffs 
Benchmark tariff levels 
Russian tariff levels on goods from 
EU  AC  CIS  ROW 
Russian WTO 
proposal  
Electricity and heat  5.21%  0.00%  5.31%  5.30%  5.00% 
Oil and gas  5.28%  5.29%  5.27%  5.28%  5.00% 
Other fuels  5.24%  5.17%  5.26%  5.26%  5.00% 
Ferrous metallurgy   10.38%  12.47%  7.79%  9.54%  8.00% 
Nonferrous metallurgy   9.92%  12.42%  6.72%  9.81%  9.00% 
Chemical industry and oil refinery  9.12%  11.17%  11.82%  9.61%  7.00% 
Machinery and equipment   10.51%  11.87%  12.05%  11.11%  9.00% 
Light industry   15.40%  12.82%  30.98%  20.99%  14.00% 
Food-processing industry   13.77%  16.98%  25.88%  9.21%  9.00% 
Other industries   10.80%  10.88%  15.03%  11.15%  10.00% 
Agriculture and forestry   5.30%  5.38%  5.80%  5.22%  5.00% 
Construction  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Transport and communication  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
Other services  10.33%  12.98%  22.94%  13.35%  0.00% 
Finance, banking and insurance  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00% 
 
 